The Rediscovery of Doctrine: The US Army and Counterinsurgency
Authors: Daniel S. Roper and Richard L. Kiper
Volume 6, Number 1 (Autumn 2010), pp. 23-42.
Abstract
United States military efforts to topple Saddam Hussein and liberate Iraq from oppression began on 17 March 2003 and concluded less than thirty days later. During the following summer, however, an insurgency began to grow—an event which the US Army was unprepared to counter. This article will address the reasons for that lack of preparedness, what the Army did to recover from its ineffective response, and the lessons that the US Army and US military at large must learn from this experience.
About the Authors
Colonel Daniel S. Roper is director of the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served on the US Army Staff and on the US military Joint Staff. He also served on the staff of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command in Operation Iraqi Freedom. daniel.s.roper@us.army.mil.
Dr. Richard L. Kiper is an analyst in the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center. He is a retired Army officer with service in Vietnam. He also served as an Army historian in Afghanistan and taught history at West Point and at the Army Command and General Staff College. richard.kiper@us.army.mil.
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