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Adaptation in the Field: The British Army’s Difficult Campaign in Iraq
Author: Daniel Marston
Volume 6, Number 1 (Autumn 2010), pp. 71-84.
Abstract
British operations leading the Multi-National Division Iraq (South East) (MND (SE)) Iraq were expected by many to be highly successful due to the British Army’s long and distinguished history of successfully prosecuting counterinsurgencies around the globe. However, complacency and hubris, coupled with an inadequate understanding of the mission facing MND (SE) foiled British attempts to achieve success. It was only through a ‘bottom-up’ revision of the British Army’s efforts, led by junior and mid-ranking officers, that significant reforms were made. These helped the British Army increase its effectiveness in line with US efforts, and allowed them to begin handing over control for security to their Iraqi counterparts.
About the Author
Daniel Marston, DPhil (Oxon) FRHistS, holds the Ike Skelton Distinguished Chair in Counterinsurgency at the US Army Command and General Staff College. He was previously a Research Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University and a Senior Lecturer in War Studies at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. He is author of the Phoenix from the Ashes: The Indian Army in the Burma Campaign, 1942-45, winner of the 2003 Field Marshal Templer Medal, and co-editor of Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (two editions). He has served as a visiting fellow at the Multi-National Forces Iraq Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence at Taji, Iraq, and advises the American, British, and Australian militaries on COIN history and doctrine. He has been advising in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2006. daniel.marston@balliol-oxford.com.
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