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The Closing of the Australian Military Mind: The ADF and Operational Art
Author: Michael Evans
Volume 4, Number 2 (Winter 2008), pp. 105-131.
Abstract
This article argues that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) has failed to keep abreast of conceptual developments and debates regarding operational art that have occurred in peer English-speaking militaries. This situation amounts to an unacceptable ‘closing of the Australian military mind’ which requires intellectual remedy. A revival of Australian operational art is necessary because in the globalised conditions of the early 21st century, the ADF is faced by a simultaneous requirement to be a global ‘security contributor’ and a regional ‘security leader’. These parallel roles reflect the manner in which Australia’s geopolitical position is being transformed through the emergence of a complex global-regional nexus in statecraft and strategy. The military requirements stemming from Australia’s evolving global-regional interface must be met by the development of a new and dynamic ADF middle-power model of operational art. Australian operational art must seek to reflect a middle-power conceptual framework and should consciously seek to integrate two emerging ADF functions: alliance force-provision based upon global ‘missions of choice’ and lead nation force-generation based upon regional ‘missions of necessity’. In order to develop a relevant middle-power construct of 21st century operational art, the ADF must embrace a number of reforms. These reforms include adopting a functional approach to operational concept development, improving joint doctrine, developing comprehensive campaign planning and introducing significant reforms into the joint professional military education system.
About the Author
Dr Michael Evans is the Australian Defence College Fellow and was formerly Head of the Australian Army’s Land Warfare Studies Centre at the Royal Military College, Duntroon. This article is based on a paper written for the Adviser to the Vice Chief of the Australian Defence Force for Warfighting and Lessons Learned in January 2008. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official views of either the Australian Defence College or the Department of Defence. drme@ozemail.com.au.
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