
Advancing Human Security: New Strategic Thinking for Australia

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'Human security' presents an opportunity for Australia to embrace a more holistic approach to security that can accommodate the vulnerabilities of both the individual and the state, as well as help achieve the Millennium Development Goals. This article argues for the inclusion of human security as part of Australian Government strategic guidance to better shape Australia's contribution in preventing and responding to complex emergencies and natural disasters. Six policy initiatives are recommended, centred on the inclusion of human security in new Australian strategic guidance.

There will never be a really free and enlightened State until the State comes to recognize the individual as a higher and independent power, from which all its own power and authority are derived, and treats him accordingly.

Henry David Thoreau (1848)¹

This article argues for the inclusion of human security in Australian Government strategic guidance to better shape Australia's preventative diplomacy and disaster management, as well as in its response to complex emergencies² and natural disasters. Human security remains a contested strategic concept, but there is a growing consensus by state and non-state actors that human security provides an opportunity for a more holistic approach to security that can accommodate the vulnerabilities of both the individual and the state. Unlike a growing number of other countries (including Canada, Switzerland and Japan among others),³ human security

¹ Henry David Thoreau, in Owen Thomas (ed), *Walden and Civil Disobedience: Authoritative Texts, Background Review and Essays in Criticism* (New York: WW Norton and Company, 1966), p. 243.

² The Inter-Agency Standing Committee defines a complex emergency as: "a humanitarian crisis in a country, region, or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country programme." Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, <<http://ochaonline.un.org/>> [Accessed 5 January 2008].

³ For examples of countries who are utilising a human security paradigm in their strategic guidance and foreign policies see: <<http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/cip-pic/gbpbythematicfocus-en.aspx>> (Canada); <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/index.html> (Japan); <<http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/dfa/orgcha/sectio/pad/pad4.html>> (Switzerland); and <<http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/members-e.php>> (Human Security Network) [Accessed 3 February 2008].

is not reflected in current Australian Government strategic guidance,⁴ which pre-dates the *Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders' Declaration* of September 2007, and was hosted in Sydney by the Australian Government. The declaration recognised that “human security is essential to economic growth and prosperity”, and committed to enhance “cooperation on challenges to human security”.⁵ It also emphasised the importance of human security beyond that expressed in extant Australian strategic guidance.

The concept of human security is based around the rights of individuals and communities to live in ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’, and possessing the freedom to make their own decisions that impact on their well-being. Fundamental to human security are *protection* and *empowerment*. People are entitled to be *protected* from human rights abuses, and to be *empowered* with the capacity to make decisions in their own and their community’s interests. International initiatives—such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)—present opportunities to enhance human security, but such initiatives need concerted commitment from the international community.

While traditional concepts of security focus on the territorial sovereignty of the state and its vital national interests, human security recognises that the state has not always been able to assure the protection of its citizens and sometimes has been the perpetrator of insecurity and genocide. On such occasions the international community has a ‘responsibility to protect’ people under threat or attack—a commitment agreed to unanimously by nations (including Australia) at the United Nations (UN) Leaders’ Summit in 2005.⁶ The adoption and implementation of human security by the Australian Government would assist in fulfilling the responsibility of states to protect their own citizens, and in strengthening the rule of law in states emerging from complex emergencies. A human security commitment would help strengthen the governance-security-development nexus, whereby governance is about building social stability through the rule of law, security is about protecting the individual and the community, and development is about the sustainable well-being of the community.

⁴ Australian Government White Papers: a) *Advancing the National Interest*, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, <http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/publications.html>. [Accessed 25 November 2007]; b) *Defence 2000 - Our Future Defence Force*, Department of Defence, <http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/index.htm>. [Accessed 25 November 2007]; c) *Australia’s National Security: Defence Update 2005*, Department of Defence, <http://www.defence.gov.au/update2005/index.cfm>. [Accessed 25 November 2007]; d) *Australian Aid: Promoting Growth and Stability 2006*, Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), http://www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pdf/wp_summary.pdf. [Accessed 25 November 2007].

⁵ APEC 2007 Leaders’ Declaration, <http://www.apec.org/apec/leaders__declarations/2007.html> [Accessed 2 February 2008].

⁶ Responsibility to Protect Engaging Civil Society Project, <<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php>> [Accessed 15 February 2008].

The achievement of human security is likely to require more, not less, international interventions. Moreover, the three categories of multinational operations—warfighting, humanitarian and peace operations—have converged, giving rise to ‘three block wars’ and contested humanitarian and military ‘space’ where military and police forces are increasingly deployed alongside humanitarian agencies, and where the reality of the civil-military interface will require a more unified understanding by all the actors involved. As well, the need for effective community policing and riot control capabilities has become increasingly important in maintaining the rule of law during stabilisation, de-militarisation, and post-conflict reconstruction. Security forces have significant resources that may assist in the humanitarian effort, but they are not and can never be humanitarian workers. Improved levels of mutual understanding and respect are required by security forces and humanitarian actors if strong and stable civil societies are to emerge and cycles of conflict and poverty are to be averted. In this complex environment a more coordinated ‘whole-of-government’ and ‘whole-of-nation’ approach will be required by Australia, accompanied by a long-term commitment, as well as better understanding of local culture.

What is Human Security?

Human security as a concept first emerged in the 1994 UN Development Programme (UNDP) *Human Development Report*, and stresses the need to achieve and maintain a minimum quality of life. In the words of the more recent Commission on Human Security, it

complements state security, enhances human rights and strengthens human development. It seeks to protect people against a broad range of threats to individuals and communities and, further, to empower them to act on their own behalf. And it seeks to forge a global alliance to strengthen the institutional policies that link individuals and the state—and the state with a global world. Human security thus brings together the human elements of security, of rights, of development.⁷

State-centric security has traditionally been concerned with the principles of *realpolitik*, and has focused on territorial sovereignty and vital national interests to ensure the integrity of the state. It is primarily concerned with threats to the existence of the state posed by interstate wars, internal conflicts, arms races, revolutions, and terrorism. In contrast, human security places emphasis on soft power, putting people as the foci of attention by recognising that people constitute the state and are often vulnerable to threats and human rights abuses including genocide, gender-based violence, disease, poverty, trafficking, natural disasters, illegal weapons and criminal violence.

⁷ Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now*, 2003, <<http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/English/chapter1.pdf>> [Accessed 16 August 2007].

As noted by the Human Security Centre, “all proponents of human security agree that its primary goal is the protection of individuals”,⁸ but there are two main schools of thought (the broad and the narrow), which contest the nature and extent of threats that should legitimately comprise human security.⁹ The narrow school, as championed by Andrew Mack, contends that greater analytical value can be gained by focusing on ‘freedom from fear’.¹⁰ Mack argues that by embracing “almost all forms of harm to individuals”, human security as a concept “loses any real descriptive power”.¹¹ Proponents of the broad school advocate that human security should encompass a more comprehensive range of threats beyond ‘freedom from fear’. This school includes Ramesh Thakur, who sees it as the “protection of people from critical life-threatening dangers”, and the Commission on Human Security, who see human security functioning to “protect the vital core of all human lives”.¹² Despite this debate over the scope of the concept, Caroline Thomas has noted:

The two key aspects of human security are not mutually exclusive; indeed, neither aspect is sufficient for the enjoyment of human security, and each depends on the existence of the other for its own full realization. An individual and his/her community must be free from fear to reliably enjoy freedom from want; and without freedom from want there can be no freedom from fear.¹³

As the concept of human security has evolved so have its detractors questioned its conceptual analytical value. For example, Barry Buzan has accepted the “moral case” for human security, but considers

the cost to be paid is loss of analytical purchase on collective actors both as the main agents of security provision and as possessors of a claim to survival in their own right.¹⁴

Similarly, Roland Paris has argued that human security is an “inscrutable concept”, suggesting that its broad applications and lack of an identifiable definition make it difficult for academics to assess.¹⁵ Astri Sukhre has also argued that the term human security has little analytic value, contending that

⁸ Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report*, 2005, <www.humansecurityreport.info> [Accessed 16 August 2007]. From September 2007 the Human Security Centre has been located at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada. From 2002-2007 it was located at the Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia in Canada.

⁹ Pauline Kerr, ‘Human Security’, in A. Collins (ed), *Contemporary Security Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 106.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

¹¹ Andrew Mack, ‘A Signifier of Shared Values’, *Security Dialogue*, vol.35, no.3 (2004), pp. 366-367.

¹² Kerr, ‘Human Security’, p. 95.

¹³ Caroline Thomas, ‘Globalization and Human Security’, in A. McGrew and N. K. Poku (eds), *Globalization, Development and Human Security* (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), p. 115.

¹⁴ Barry Buzan, ‘A Reductionist, Idealistic Notion that Adds Little Analytical Value’, *Security Dialogue*, vol. 35, no. 3 (2004), p. 370.

¹⁵ Roland Paris, ‘Still an Inscrutable Concept’, *Security Dialogue*, vol. 35, no. 3, (2004), pp. 370-371.

for methodological purposes the concept of 'vulnerability' would have greater normative value when applied to refugees and displaced populations.¹⁶

Richard Jolly and Deepayan Basu Ray rebut these assertions, contending that the strength of the concept lies in its ability to encapsulate the plethora of threats that in reality exist, and are a threat to security, despite the difficulty in analysing them as a whole. They state that:

Unless one wishes to argue there is no interconnectedness at all, the case for taking account of the interactions and consequences seems overwhelming.¹⁷

Having considered these contrasting views, Australian analyst Pauline Kerr contends that one of the strengths of human security is that it enhances state security by invigorating and creating a more holistic understanding of security. Kerr argues that the state, often a violator of human security, is also central to its effective implementation. This occurs in four ways: firstly, not all states undermine the security of their citizens, and thus not all states "work against human security"; secondly, states have the means to facilitate human security via their material capacities; thirdly, stable state building should be the objective of human security; and, finally, because the state seems certain to remain the main actor in international politics, its role will be crucial in securing the lives of millions of the most vulnerable.¹⁸

While the concept of human security may be imprecise and contested, this is not necessarily dissimilar to the elastic interpretations by state leaders of the more traditional concept of territorial sovereignty and vital interests. In the real world, it seems more sensible to consider human security and state-centric security as being complementary and mutually reinforcing, rather than as competing concepts. As Pauline Kerr has emphasised, states should not feel threatened by human security because they are the key agents in its implementation: "the role of properly functioning states will continue to be central to improving human security."¹⁹

Human Security as Strategic Guidance

Human security is increasingly being recognised as a central component of strategic guidance by many states. Japan and Canada have been key proponents of the concept and have comprehensively integrated it into their foreign policy agendas. However, they have approached its application in

¹⁶ Astri Sukhre 'Human Security and the Protection of Refugees', in Edward Newman and Joanne Van Selm (eds), *Refugees and Forced Displacement: International Security, Human Vulnerability, and the State* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003), p. 107.

¹⁷ R. Jolly and D. Ray, *The Human Security Framework and National Human Development Reports*, May 2006, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/human_security_gn.pdf> [Accessed 15 January 2008].

¹⁸ Kerr, 'Human Security', p. 96.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

varied ways. The Japanese Government has focused on 'freedom from want' and the impact on human security of economic downturns.²⁰ To facilitate this Japan established The Trust Fund for Human Security through the UN.²¹ Canada has focused on 'freedom from fear' as the pillar of its human security doctrine. As part of its human security agenda Canada has promoted initiatives such as the International Criminal Court, the landmines treaty and R2P.²² As well, other countries have been increasingly adopting human security as part of their strategic guidance, resulting in the formation of the Human Security Network where countries can work together in fostering human security.²³

Extant Australian strategic guidance predates the *APEC Leaders' Declaration* in Sydney, September 2007, at which the importance of human security was acknowledged. Recognising the linkages between human security and global economic development, APEC leaders (as part of a range of other commitments) "resolved to enhance our cooperation on challenges to human security" and "agreed on the need to further strengthen APEC's efforts to build community resilience and preparedness for emergencies and natural disasters".²⁴ Prior to APEC, the Howard Government had failed to incorporate human security in strategic guidance despite calls for it to do so.²⁵

Extant strategic guidance fails to acknowledge or explain human security as part of its 'whole-of-government' approach to crisis prevention and response. This situation should be redressed in forthcoming strategic guidance, where human security should form an important pillar of Australia's national security outlook and strategy, to be included in government White Papers on foreign policy, defence and overseas aid. Thus, Australia will be better able to plan for and respond to regional and global crises, and to effectively contribute to prospects for sustainable peace and development.

Within Australia, a shared understanding of human security should be agreed by the Australian Government and civil society stakeholders. Looking at Australia's national security through a human security lens will better enable Australia to contribute to strategies that will prevent conflict and crises. As well, an understanding of human security will better shape

²⁰ Thomas, 'Globalization and Human Security', p.110.

²¹ The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Japan, *The Trust Fund for Human Security*, 2007, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human_secu/t_fund21.pdf> [Accessed 15 November 2007].

²² Thomas, 'Globalization and Human Security', p.110.

²³ Human Security Network, <<http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org/members-e.php>> [Accessed 25 September 2007].

²⁴ APEC 2007 Leaders' Declaration.

²⁵ For example, see Minister for Veterans Affairs, Bruce Billson, presentation to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute on 'Human Security', 26 March 2007, <<http://www.aspi.org.au/admin/eventFiles/Billson%20Speech.pdf>> [Accessed 20 February 2008]; Michael G. Smith, 'Addressing Human Security', in *Strategy: Scoping Studies: New Thinking on Security* (Canberra: ASPI, 2004), pp. 27-30.

Australia's interventions in humanitarian and peace operations, thereby enhancing prospects for achieving long-term stability. Incorporating human security in Australian Government strategic guidance—as well as in strategic plans of Australian humanitarian agencies and non-government organisations (NGOs)—will better enable Australia to implement long-term strategies that prevent or reduce the impact of crises. A human security focus will also better inform the entry and exit strategies for military and police commitments. An understanding of human security would also inform the development of Australia's overseas aid program, as well as the development of doctrine and capabilities for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and the Australian Federal Police (AFP). Importantly, a national commitment to human security would encourage Australian NGOs to better coordinate their activities for disaster risk reduction and response.

The Governance—Security—Development Nexus


History records that in almost 50 per cent of cases, countries emerging from conflict have reverted within five years.²⁶ Although politically motivated, this resumption of conflict also occurs because of a breakdown in the implementation of effective policies on governance, security and development. The international community often contributes to this situation by providing too light a presence with too early an exit, under-resourcing, and lack of coordination between civilian and military actors. Such strategies may contribute to the renewal of hostilities and entrenched poverty. By contrast, successful interventions have played a significant role in helping to restore peace and establish the mechanisms to achieve the targets agreed in the MDGs. The absence of peace, justice and security only serves to nurture poverty, prolong displacement, deny protection, and breed cycles of discontent characterised by reprisals and conflict.

The successful implementation of human security as part of conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction efforts depends largely on the degree to which governance, security and development can operate in unison. 'Governance' means more than 'government'; it includes the rule of law, Security Sector/System Reform (SSR), and the building of community structures and standards based on cultural norms that are more resilient than the term of any political party, government or peacekeeping mission. 'Security' means more than ensuring the viability of the host government's security apparatus; it involves the development of individual and communal protection mechanisms. 'Development' means more than measuring an increase in a nation's wealth; it is about the distribution of wealth to bring people out of poverty and to ensure the sustainable well-being of its people, as well as creating options and possibilities for people.

²⁶ Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report*.

Integrating and implementing effective policies in governance, security, and development is hard work, as much in developed states as in fragile ones.²⁷ The analogy of a three-legged stool (Figure 1) helps explain that if any one of these pillars is not working then the stool will collapse. Equally important are two factors which serve to strengthen the legs of the stool: the assurance of justice by securing and protecting human rights, and the allocation of sufficient financial and human resources to develop a stable government and free people from poverty.

Figure 1: Governance, Security and Development



It is important to understand that efforts by the international community to promote governance, security and development must avoid propping-up unstable or corrupt governments. This is where a human security approach is particularly helpful, because it provides a focus on the well-being of people at the community level, and shifts accountability to host national governments to ensure this occurs. Clearly, international efforts will be stillborn if they fail to enable governments to address unemployment, ensure that food is available, provide education, improve health and sanitation, and ensure local ownership of infrastructure development. This has been recognised by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

²⁷ For an analysis of failing states based on social, political and economic indicators see the Fund for Peace "Failed State Index", <http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=229&Itemid=366> [Accessed 7 April 2008].

in their Disaster Advisory Committee (DAC) handbook on *Security System Reform*.²⁸ The DAC handbook provides useful guidelines to help achieve “greater coordination and integration of development, security and justice policies and practices”.²⁹ Effective SSR strategies acknowledge the need to create viable security services, as well as strengthening civil society whose interests the security services have been created to serve. As stated in the DAC handbook, SSR

relates to personal and state safety, access to social services and political processes. It is a core government responsibility, necessary for economic and social development and vital for the protection of human rights.³⁰

For this reason the DAC handbook recognises civil society as a discrete sector.³¹

A 2007 collaborative NGO study on the effectiveness of the UN Peacebuilding Commission in Sierra Leone and Burundi noted that

in situations of civil war, conflict typically emerges from struggles emerging from pre-conflict governance with substantial legacies in the post-conflict period. In other words, governance is usually both part of the solution and part of the problem.³²

The same report recommended greater emphasis on ‘soft’ interventions of governance to “promote civilian oversight, political accountability and social empowerment”.³³ Generally in peace operations and post-conflict development, the Australian Government has tended to think primarily in terms of strengthening the rule of law by enhancing the host government’s security forces, legislature and judicial sector. Such support is undoubtedly required, but this is of limited value unless underpinned by robust development strategies focused at community level. A human security approach will enable Australia to better coordinate and integrate its commitment to post-conflict and natural disaster recovery efforts. Importantly, a human security model would help shape Australia’s contribution to protection and SSR by placing greater importance on the development of civil society, in addition to the more traditional development of government infrastructure and security forces. NGOs play a crucial role in helping to develop capacity, enhance protection, and strengthen governance at the community level; the very essence of human security and the foundations for sustainable peace.

²⁸ OECD, *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2007).

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 224-235.

³² ActionAid, Care International, and Cafod, *Consolidating the Peace?*, June 2007, p. 2, <<http://www.careinternational.org.uk/Peacebuilding%20report:%20Consolidating%20the%20Peace+9662.twl>> [Accessed 7 April 2008].

³³ *Ibid.*

Efforts to establish and maintain the rule of law in fragile states—particularly those emerging from conflict with limited local capacity—are difficult and lengthy. There are no quick-fix solutions. Moreover, internationals providing assistance to the judiciary, police and penal sectors often have little understanding of long-standing local cultural practices. In such situations a neo-colonial approach is in danger of being adopted, with internationals transplanting practices from their own country that are often inappropriate to the needs of the local population. For example, in their analysis of western development practice, Pritchett and Woolcock have shown that the practice of assuming that a Weberian bureaucracy is ‘*the solution*’ to overcoming lack of development has often proved culturally inappropriate, and hindered the development process.³⁴

Australia will continue to assist countries in the Asia-Pacific region to strengthen the rule of law, but its track record in places like Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste suggests that a deeper understanding of culture and language will be required. The development of professional and non-corrupt security forces will be particularly critical and challenging. The AFP can play an increasingly important role but will require the necessary training, capabilities and cultural understanding to be effective. The AFP has the potential to work alongside local police forces to help them perform many functions which are complementary to the human security agenda. Community policing will be of particular importance in such countries, requiring Australian police to be specifically trained for this purpose. Policing must be implemented in such a way that is mindful of local customs and is able to enhance the protection and empowerment of the local population.³⁵ NGOs also have an important role to play in monitoring the implementation of the rule of law, ensuring that the principles of protection and empowerment are not violated.

In each of these areas—governance, security and development—humanitarian agencies and NGOs are able to make a significant contribution. Accordingly, closer collaboration is required between the Australian Government and humanitarian actors in the planning, preparation and implementation of interventions.

³⁴ Pritchett and Woolcock argue that: “the common structure of *the solution* created the common conditions for its failure—namely, the lack of feedback mechanisms and modes for engagement of citizens in either controlling the state or directly controlling providers allowed systemic problems of organizational design to overwhelm logistics. But the logic of *the solution* is so seductive to governments (and donors) alike that it has taken decades of painful expensive failures in sector after sector to see that the problem is not just a few “mistakes” here and there, but that as an approach to *development*, it can be fundamentally wrong-headed from top to bottom.” L. Pritchett and M. Woolcock, ‘Solutions when the Solution is the Problem: Arraying the Disarray in Development’, *World Development*, vol. 32, no. 2 (2004), pp. 191-212.

³⁵ For an analysis of the role and capabilities of the AFP in international deployments, see John McFarlane, ‘The Thin Blue Line: The Strategic Role of the Australian Federal Police’, *Security Challenges*, vol.3, no. 3 (August 2007), pp. 91-108.

Enhancing Protection

The protection of civilians is an essential component of human security, and recognised as a cross cutting issue in the *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*.³⁶ However, 'protection' can mean different things to different organisations. As Holt and Berkman have noted,

operationally, military and civilian leaders may face a proliferation of approaches to protection but lack a common language to discuss them ... Clarifying the divergent approaches, how they fit together, and when each is appropriate could improve peace operations.³⁷

They have also provided an excellent summary of the various categories and concepts of protection, pointing out that more work needs to be done to coordinate these separate interpretations. A summary of these concepts is in Table 1. They have particular relevance for the ADF and AFP, as well as for civilian administrators and humanitarian workers who may be deployed to protect the civilian population.

Table 1: A Summary of Holt and Berkman's Protection Concepts

<p>Category 1: Civilian protection and traditional military approaches</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Concept 1: Protecting civilians as an obligation of military actors during the conduct of war (the Geneva Conventions concept)• Concept 2: Protecting civilians as the result of using force traditionally (the warfighting concept) <p>Category 2: Civilian protection and humanitarian thinking</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Concept 3: Civilian protection as the provision of broad security (the 'humanitarian space' concept)• Concept 4: Protecting civilians through the operational design of assistance (the relief agency concept) <p>Category 3: Civilian protection and coercive protection operations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Concept 5: Civilian protection as a set of tasks in peace operations (the UN peacekeeping task concept)• Concept 6: Protecting civilians through a military intervention to prevent mass killings (the 'responsibility to protect [R2P]' concept)

Source: V.K. Holt and T.C. Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations* (Washington: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), pp. 37-42.

At the UN summit in 2005,

³⁶ United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 18 January 2008, http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf. [Accessed 20 January 2008].

³⁷ V.K. Holt and T.C. Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations* (Washington: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), p. 183.

world leaders agreed, for the first time, that states have a primary 'responsibility to protect' their own populations and that the international community has a responsibility to act when these governments fail to protect the most vulnerable among us.³⁸

R2P was adopted by the international community to prevent future occurrences of genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, such as occurred in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s. R2P comprises a continuum of measures for the international community ranging from prevention to recovery:

- the responsibility to prevent, by addressing the root causes of conflict as a first priority and essential action;
- the responsibility to react, by implementing economic sanctions, diplomatic efforts, international prosecutions, or military intervention as a last resort; and
- the responsibility to rebuild, by ensuring full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation.

But short of R2P, peacekeeping mandates have increasingly required military and police forces to provide protection to civilian populations.³⁹ For deployments under concepts 5 and 6 there is as yet no agreed doctrine to undertake protection tasks. Clearly, more work needs to be done by military and police forces to develop doctrine for protection and to integrate this with the requirements for humanitarian protection. The potential for the ADF and AFP deployments under concepts 5 and 6 emphasises the critical need for protection doctrine. In such missions neither humanitarian nor military/police concepts of protection should be undertaken in isolation. Rather, operations should be planned and implemented through a "protection prism" to help forge greater understanding, coordination, and closer linkages between the responsibilities of the host country, the military and police, UN agencies and NGOs. Protection is, thus, a fundamental issue, and it needs to be reflected prominently and consistently in Australian strategic guidance.

The principles and practices for humanitarian protection are more developed than for security forces. Even before R2P, the meaning of humanitarian protection had been clearly defined by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and endorsed by the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee:

The concept of protection encompasses all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the

³⁸ Responsibility to Protect Engaging Civil Society Project.

³⁹ To date, seven UN missions had been mandated to protect civilians, see Holt and Berkman, *The Impossible Mandate?*, Annex 1.

spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e. human rights law, humanitarian law and refugee law).⁴⁰

Consistent with this humanitarian approach to protection, the ICRC's *Protection Guide*, prepared in 2005 by the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), provides useful guidance to all involved in protection.⁴¹ As a supporter of ALNAP, the Australian Government's Agency for International Development (AusAID) is progressively incorporating protection principles throughout the Australian aid program in consultation with NGOs and relevant UN agencies. Much more needs to be done, but a start has been made. The inclusion of human security in Australian strategic guidance would give added impetus to this process.

Civil-Military Interaction

Protection is only one area in which effective civil-military interaction has become of critical importance in achieving human security. Interventions and post-conflict reconstruction provides a complex mix of international and local actors. In this environment it is not surprising that significant tensions and dilemmas persist, particularly in the difficult area of state building.⁴² The civilian component is huge, comprising everything non-military including civil administrators, civilian police, business and contractors, humanitarian agencies, the host government, community-based organisations and the population itself. Civil-military interaction occurs at all these levels, but often the most fractious is between military forces and humanitarian agencies.

One such dilemma is the increasingly contested 'space' occupied by military forces and humanitarian workers which has become blurred and contested. Military space represents a geographical area of operations in which military forces are assigned specific responsibilities and undertake assigned tasks. Humanitarian space is a geographic area where humanitarian principles and policies can be applied free from violence and conflict, and where humanitarians can work in safety.⁴³ Optimally, humanitarian space should be considered as a place where humanitarian principles are not jeopardised and as a place where human rights policies are assured and implemented. Underpinning the concept of humanitarian space are the universal principles of humanitarian action as defined by the ICRC:

⁴⁰ S.G. Caverzaslo, *Strengthening Protection in War—A Search for Professional Standards: Summary of Discussions Among Human Rights and Humanitarian Organisations* (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 2001).

⁴¹ H. Slim and A. Bonwick, *Protection: An ALNAP Guide for Humanitarian Agencies* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2005).

⁴² For example, see Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, *Managing Contradictions: the Inherent Dilemmas of Postwar Statebuilding* (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007).

⁴³ For a fuller analysis of humanitarian space and 'three block wars', see S.J. Meharg (ed.), *Helping Hands and Loaded Arms: Navigating the Military and Humanitarian Space* (Nova Scotia: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2007), pp. 1-7.

- Humanity: assistance to people in distress without discrimination;
- Impartiality: action based solely on need;
- Neutrality: action must not favour any side in an armed conflict;
- Independence: humanitarian action must be kept separate from political, economic, military or other objectives.

However, increasingly the quest for human security is challenging this traditional notion of humanitarian space. As with protection, civil and military responsibilities have overlapped or have become less clear. Neutrality and impartiality have been challenged by humanitarian NGOs and UN agencies alike. UN mandates often specify tasks that may not always be perceived as neutral and impartial by all protagonists; and a growing number of humanitarian NGOs argue that a rights-based approach⁴⁴ works against the traditional views of impartiality, neutrality and consent. Put simply, to assist the poor and marginalised to secure their rights requires taking a political stand against injustice.

The need for closer interaction between the military and humanitarian agencies has been recognised for some time. Senior US military leaders have been addressing this matter for more than a decade, albeit with some misunderstanding of the proper role of humanitarian NGOs. In the mid-1990s, the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, emphasised the need for military partnership with NGOs in handling crises: "If you are successful, they are successful; and if they are successful, you are successful. We need each other."⁴⁵ A similar sentiment was expressed by US Secretary of State Colin Powell at an NGO leaders' seminar in 2001, a month after the Al Qaeda terrorist attack on New York and Washington. Powell stated:

I am serious about making sure we have the best relationship with the NGOs who are such a force multiplier for us, such an important part of our combat team ... it's a partnership ... for those of us...all committed to the same, singular purpose to help every man and woman in need, who is hungry, who is without hope, to help every one of them fill a belly, get a roof over their heads, educate their children, have hope.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ "A rights-based approach to development is a conceptual framework for the process of human development that is normatively based on international human rights standards and operationally directed to promoting and protecting human rights." United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, *Human Rights in Development*, 2002, <<http://www.unhcr.ch/development/approaches.html>> [Accessed 29 February 2008].

⁴⁵ US Joint Warfighting Center, *Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 1997), p. II-2.

⁴⁶ Colin Powell, 'Remarks to the National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders of Nongovernmental Organizations', 26 October 2001, <<http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2001/5762.htm>> [Accessed 20 November 2007].

Whilst Powell's sentiments were undoubtedly sincere he misread the essential point that NGOs do not want to be part of any military's 'combat team' or in any way thought of as a 'force multiplier'. It is encouraging that Shalikashvili and Powell recognised the importance of NGOs, but somewhat disheartening that the military's entrée into civil-military cooperation should view success in terms of fulfilling a military mission. NGOs have never been concerned in achieving a military mission and are always focused on improving human security through the securing of human rights and facilitating sustainable livelihoods for the poor and the vulnerable. This view is now better understood by the US military, as reflected in recent doctrine which advises commanders that:

Gaining the support of and coordinating operations with these NGOs can be difficult. Establishing basic awareness of these groups and their activities may be the most that commanders can achieve. ... many NGOs arrive before military forces and remain afterwards. They can support lasting stability. To the greatest extent possible, commanders try to complement and not override their capabilities. Building a complementary, trust based relationship is vital.⁴⁷

Generally speaking, civil-military interaction in the humanitarian dimension works best when:

- security exists and humanitarians have freedom of movement to undertake their work;
- military forces do not undertake humanitarian action except as a last resort or in a short-term supporting role;
- civilian authority predominates and the military is subordinate and accountable to it;
- the intervention has unambiguous international legitimacy, with no question of military forces or humanitarians being considered the proxies of belligerent donors;
- the majority of the host government and population is supportive of the intervention and generally approves of the behaviour of security forces; and
- the military do not attempt to overtly include humanitarians as part of their 'hearts and minds' campaigns.

These optimum situations are, however, rare in international crises, which means that relations between military forces and humanitarian actors will frequently be under strain. Experience suggests that when the military

⁴⁷ Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 *Counterinsurgency* (Washington DC: Department of Defense, 2006), p. 2-1.

secures, but does not occupy, the humanitarian space, the best areas for civil-military coordination are in the provision of logistic support, communications, and transportation, with some short-term possibilities in the areas of training, infrastructure development, and the exchange of information (but not intelligence gathering). Conversely, the main areas of discord occur when security is threatened or breaks down, when humanitarian actors are denied freedom of movement, when the military encroaches on the humanitarian space by undertaking tasks that should be the responsibility of civilian agencies, and/or denies the provision of assistance to people in need.⁴⁸

Civil-military interaction has been influenced by the changing nature of conflict and intervention. In military terms, contemporary interventions can be classified into three broad types—traditional warfighting, humanitarian operations, and peace operations. Although each has distinct characteristics, they have increasingly converged to be present in a single theatre of operations. Inter-state war remains a real and present danger, requiring states to constantly adapt traditional warfighting skills. History confirms that nations go to war with each other, and there is no evidence to suggest that this situation will change in the foreseeable future, although inter-state war has been in decline since World War 2. With the end of the Cold War the majority of conflicts have been intra-state, characterised by significant humanitarian suffering and requiring considerable post-conflict reconstruction and state building.⁴⁹ Combatant casualties have continued to decline over the last century, but the number of civilian casualties in conflict has continued to rise as a percentage.⁵⁰ While positive measures have been taken to improve international humanitarian law and strengthen the laws of armed conflict,⁵¹ more and more civilians (relative to combatants) have become the victims of conflict. Irregular warfare, based on the principles of insurgency and guerrilla operations, has become commonplace, with convergence and overlap of the three categories of multinational operations.

The term 'Three Block War (3BW)' was coined in 1997 by the Commandant of the US Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak, to describe the reality of modern conflict. Spawned by experiences in places like Somalia and Bosnia, Krulak described the lot of young US soldiers and marines:

⁴⁸ For an analysis of NGO/Military interaction in Afghanistan see: William Maley, 'Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Some Reflections', *NATO Review* (Autumn 2007). Maley identified a diverse range of 25 provincial reconstruction teams, about half led by the US, and the remainder led by NATO and non-NATO states (including Australia and New Zealand).

⁴⁹ See, for example, William Durch (ed.), *Twenty-first Century Peace Operations* (Washington DC: USIP & Stimson Center, 2007).

⁵⁰ Human Security Centre, *Human Security Report*.

⁵¹ See, for example: International Committee of the Red Cross, *1949 Conventions and Additional Protocols*, <<http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView>>; International Criminal Court <<http://www.icc-cpi.int/home.html>>; United Nations Security Council, 'Resolution 1325', 2000, <http://www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf> [Accessed 7 April 2008].

In one moment of time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart—conducting peacekeeping operations—and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle—all on the same day... all within three city blocks.⁵²

The rise of 3BW has brought military forces and civil agencies in closer proximity, requiring greater understanding and coordination. In the future, it is likely that more, rather than less, legitimate force will be required in interventions to achieve a secure environment and to give peace a chance. The commitment of states to R2P accentuates this point. As Thomas Weiss has noted,

the greater danger for a more just world order comes from too little, rather than too much, humanitarian intervention; there should be more, rather than fewer, military-civil interactions; we should be less preoccupied that military action will be taken too often for insufficient humanitarian reasons, and more so that it will be taken too rarely for the right reasons.⁵³

Humanitarian and peace operations provide a real demonstration of where the concepts of human security and state-centric security converge. In such situations the military and police can play a pivotal role in maintaining security and helping to lay the foundations for the rule of law. As one of the civil components, humanitarian agencies are able to make a significant contribution in helping to strengthen civil society as the cornerstone for sustainable peace. As Sarah Michael has noted,

NGOs are especially well suited to action for human security because of their size and reach, closeness to local populations, willingness to confront the *status quo*, and ability to address transitional threats through coalition-building.⁵⁴

By incorporating a human security approach in Australian strategic guidance, Australian civil-military actors should be more willing to consult and plan their interventions before and after deployment.

Future Directions for Australian Policy

The adoption of human security as part of Australia's approach would enhance the prospects for more integrated interventions, and assist in developing more robust peacebuilding strategies. Human security could be reflected in policy in at least six ways as outlined below.

⁵² Charles C. Krulak, 'The Three Block War: Fighting in Urban Areas', cited in Meharg (ed.), *Helping Hands & Loaded Arms*, p. 143.

⁵³ Thomas G. Weiss, *Military-Civilian Interactions: Humanitarian Crises and the Responsibility to Protect* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2nd Edition, 2005), p. 214.

⁵⁴ Sarah Michael, *The Role of NGOs in Human Security*, Working Paper no. 2 (Cambridge, MA: Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations and the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2002), p. 2.

1. HUMAN SECURITY AS STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

Australia can more effectively enhance the prospects for sustainable peace by adopting and implementing human security in a more holistic manner. A major policy initiative for the Australian Government is to recognise the importance of human security in strategic guidance. Building on the *APEC Leaders' Declaration* of September 2007, human security should be included as a vital element in national strategic assessments and White Papers on foreign policy, defence and overseas aid. Such guidance would strengthen the linkages between government and civil society, as well as providing a more useful platform from which to approach regional neighbours. The inclusion of human security as part of policy would better enable ministers and government departments to appreciate the long-term requirements for conflict prevention and interventions in disasters and complex emergencies. In particular, a human security focus recognises the critical need to assist in building civil society from the community level as well as through strengthening the machinery of government. A commitment to human security creates a positive, people-centred rationale for Australian intervention in regional and global crises that enhances prospects for economic development and a more sustainable peace. Policy guidance on human security would help forge closer collaboration between the Australian Government and humanitarian agencies in the planning, preparation and implementation of disaster risk reduction strategies and responses to complex emergencies and disaster relief, with improved prospect of securing more lasting and durable outcomes.

More can be done to coordinate a 'whole-of-government' and 'whole-of-nation' approach in helping to build human security and stable civil societies. Improved coordination between government departments and inclusion of broader civil society is required to better understand, support and strengthen the effectiveness of Australia's support to peace operations.

2. ENHANCED CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION

Building on its election pledge, the newly elected Rudd Government has the opportunity to act quickly and establish a centre of excellence to promote civil-military coordination. The central focus of such a centre would be to operationalise the requirements for peace operations and post-conflict reconstruction by developing a more coordinated 'whole-of-government' and 'whole-of-nation' approach. The centre could establish global best practice in the practical civil-military cooperation field and in action research on this topic, building on the experience of (and initiating collaboration with) other international centres already established to advance effectiveness in peace interventions and post-conflict reconstruction.⁵⁵ The centre should have a regional focus with international connections to enhance understanding of

⁵⁵ Such centres of excellence already exist in such countries as the US, UK, Canada, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands. Much can be learned from these centres and in forging closer collaboration with key UN departments and agencies.

disaster management, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. The centre would inform government decision-making by helping to provide a more coordinated inter-departmental position.

Such a centre could conduct specific training courses and undertake contingency planning to ensure best practice and inform policy making. These activities would not replace current training undertaken by the ADF and AFP, but address a more strategic level of planning and research to facilitate cross-discipline learning required for complex emergencies. An important aspect of the centre's work would be to undertake relevant research to ensure currency and help influence policy decisions. Such research would link the centre with the UN and key research institutes internationally.

Experience shows that many of the difficulties encountered in complex emergencies and disaster response could be minimised or averted if proper preparation and planning was coordinated by key participants.⁵⁶ The centre would be able to play a critical role in redressing current shortcomings and in contributing to the improvement of UN procedures and practices.

3. INTEGRATED PROTECTION MECHANISMS

Protection is an essential component of human security, and needs to be integrated in the planning of and responses to complex emergencies and natural disasters. The growing commitment by AusAID and NGOs to enhance humanitarian protection can be developed further, and linked with the requirements for military and police forces to conduct protection operations, particularly under the R2P framework and/or in lesser situations where the 'protection of civilians' is stated or implied in operational mandates. In accordance with the *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, the Australian Government and NGOs should promote the principle of protection and develop better mechanisms to enhance coordination by all key parties. Increased effectiveness and greater synergy will be achieved in post-conflict situations if the military, police and humanitarian agencies operated through a 'protection prism' to help build local institutions and promote the rule of law. In particular, operational doctrine for implementing R2P is urgently required, and Australia should want to take a place at the forefront in shaping this doctrine.

4. STRENGTHENING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The UN's ability to implement peace operations is far from perfect, but no better option has yet been devised.⁵⁷ The UN system with all its

⁵⁶ For example, see Michael G. Smith (with Moreen Dee), *Peacekeeping in East Timor: the Path to Independence* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp. 103-105, 123-145.

⁵⁷ See James Dobbins et al, *The History of Nation-Building* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005), which contends that UN-led peacekeeping has been more successful than US-led interventions,

imperfections offers the best option for a coordinated global effort to achieve the MDGs, enhance the fulfilment of human rights, bring down absolute levels of poverty, and sustain human lives and livelihoods.

The UN also provides the best available mechanism for ensuring international legitimacy for intervention, with the most advanced protocols to implement peace operations effectively. However, if and when the UN is not part of a peacekeeping operation, such as regional or hybrid operations, these missions should still comply with UN protocol, and operate under guidance from key agencies within the UN, especially the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Peacebuilding Commission, and UNDP.

The current trend for coalition and regional commitments has merit to the extent that they operate with legitimacy under UN mandate or approval, using doctrine and procedures that are consistent with the UN. If such commitments are limited to regime change, or focused primarily on the 'war on terror', or to prop-up particular governments, then they are unlikely to achieve sustainable outcomes in the longer-term. From a humanitarian and human rights perspective the focus of peace operations should always be on achieving sustainable human security through capacity-building, protection and empowerment.

5. ENHANCING ADF, AFP AND AUSAID COORDINATION

As noted above the Australian commitment to peace interventions and post-conflict reconstruction has generally been primarily to strengthen the rule of law by enhancing the host government's security forces, legislature and judicial sector, with some deployment of technical and humanitarian specialists. Such support is critical, but would be more strategically focused if it were shaped by more robust development strategies to develop human security at the community level as a critical building block for sustainable peace and prosperity. East Timor provides an example where funding on military and police interventions has exceeded humanitarian aid and development by 7 to 1.⁵⁸ A human security approach will enable better coordination, calibration and integration of commitment to post-conflict and natural disaster recovery efforts. Importantly, a human security model would help provide a practical framework to enhance collaboration between AusAID, the ADF and the AFP. This approach would significantly shape Australia's contribution to protection and building a sustainable peace, enhancing the economic and political resilience of democracy in our region.

and at far less financial cost. See also William J. Durch and Tobias C. Berkman, *Who Should Keep the Peace?* (Washington DC: Stimson Centre, 2006), which emphasises the need for the UN to be resourced more adequately to undertake peacekeeping tasks.

⁵⁸ G. Earl, 'Time to Rethink East Timor Approach', *Australian Financial Review*, 18 January 2008, p. 12.

6. IMPROVED COORDINATION BY AUSTRALIAN NGOS

More work is required by Australian-based NGOs to improve planning and cooperation between those agencies engaged in disaster mitigation and response. The Australian Council for International Development—the peak body for Australian-based NGOs—has a critical role to play.⁵⁹ The Australian NGO sector collaborates well on many issues, but is fiercely competitive in fundraising and advocacy, and has displayed little motivation to undertake joint planning in preparedness and disaster response. This is due partly to the asymmetry and disparity of the NGO sector, partly to the lack of a collaborative planning culture, partly reflective of different approaches to disaster mitigation and response, and partly that the larger agencies do not seem to see value in sharing their experience and wealth to optimise a coordinated Australian NGO response. The government could encourage Australian NGOs to establish a central fundraising mechanism to handle emergencies, similar to the Disaster Emergencies Committee that has existed in Britain for many years.⁶⁰ As well, a number of Australian-based NGOs can contribute more constructively to the development of UN doctrine and procedures relevant to peacekeeping and complex emergencies. It is too late and inefficient for NGOs to operate in an *ad hoc* manner on the ground when operations have commenced and people are most in need of humanitarian assistance. Post-mission reports have consistently revealed that the NGO community globally (not only Australian NGOs) has often been disorganised, reflecting poor communications and resulting in considerable waste and duplication of effort.⁶¹

Conclusion

Human security provides a useful paradigm for inclusion in Australia's strategic guidance. A human-centred approach can assist Australia in devising policies and strategies that may better prevent conflict, and assist in post-conflict and disaster reconstruction. A human security approach can help in implementing strategies that enhance prospects for sustainable peace, with reduced levels of violence and poverty, and increased prospects of attaining the MDGs. Most importantly, a human security approach helps to empower individuals and communities to be more accountable for their own protection and actions.

Human security can complement and strengthen national security by helping to enhance the security of a nation's citizens. By utilising a human security

⁵⁹ ACFID is based in Canberra and represents its members who adhere to the ACFID Code of Conduct, see: <www.acfid.asn.au>.

⁶⁰ See Disaster Emergency Committee, 2007, <<http://www.dec.org.uk/>> [Accessed 29 February 2008]. The Australian NGO community previously established an International Disaster Emergency Committee which was disbanded due to disagreement of the larger NGOs.

⁶¹ For example see: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, *World Disasters Report 2005: Focus on Information in Disasters*, <www.ifrc.org/publicat/wdr2005/index.asp>. In particular see Chapter 4, 'Information Black Hole in Aceh'.

paradigm, governments, peace intervention missions, civil society organisations, humanitarian agencies and NGOs can cooperate more effectively. Civil-military coordination can be improved through a better understanding of humanitarian and military space, providing that humanitarian principles and international humanitarian laws (including human rights and refugee laws) are not jeopardised. Getting this balance right in highly politicised and contested environments will remain difficult at best, and sometimes unachievable. However, carefully conceived in consultation between the diverse actors involved, a human security approach supported and facilitated by the Australian Government will help to shape better policies, to intervene more effectively when required, and to enhance prospects for sustainable peace.

In the Malayan Emergency in the early 1950s—an era when British doctrine of ‘keeping the peace’ preceded UN peacekeeping norms and when NGOs barely existed—the British High Commissioner, Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer, commented that the shooting side of the business was only 25 per cent of the trouble and the other 75 per cent was in ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the Malayan people to support the British. In contemporary complex emergencies the problem remains the same, but the solution rests not with the people supporting intervening or neo-colonial powers, but rather the other way around. Only then will the prospects for sustainable peace be realised, and for this to occur a greater commitment to human security based on a willingness to listen more carefully to those who are most vulnerable will be required. The emerging attention to human security, engaging all leading actors in this field, offers a timely opportunity for Australia to play a significant role in shaping this discussion and the doctrines and practices that are developed as a result of that debate.

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